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Abstract 
 
Agent  technology  is  a  good  approach  for  solving  a 
number  of  problems  concerned  with  personalized 
learning.  In  personal  learning  contexts  individual 
students  are  given  an  environment  that  takes  into 
account of their needs, interests and aspirations, and 
this  is  intended  to  lead  to  an  enhanced  learning 
experience. The aim of this paper is to show how agent 
systems  can  not  only  form  a  good  framework  for 
distributed e-learning systems, but also how they can 
be  applied  in  personal  learning  contexts  where  the 
learners are autonomous and independent. We present 
an e-learning scenario where students try to register 
for their preferred courses but where courses will only 
run  if  enough  students  register.  In  this  context,  we 
introduce, for the first time, a prototype of an agent-
based voting system in e-learning, where autonomous 
software  agents  vote  on  behalf  of  the  students.  We 
present  a  number  of  different  voting  strategies  that 
student agents could use. Finally, through simulation 
we empirically investigate the resulting satisfaction of 
the students in the system.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Multi-agent systems are being used in a wide variety of 
applications,  ranging  from  comparatively  small 
systems  for  personal  assistance,  to  open,  complex, 
systems  for  industrial  applications  [2].  In  e-learning, 
multiagent systems appear to be a promising approach 
to  deal  with  the  challenges  in  educational 
environments.  They  can  provide  new  patterns  of 
learning and applications, such as personal assistants, 
user  guides  and  alternative  help  systems,  which  are 
helpful for both students and teachers [6]. It has been 
argued  that  using  multiagent  systems  to  design 
educational systems can lead to more versatile, faster 
and lower cost systems [10]. 
Agent  technologies  could  allow  us  to  take  this 
personalization to new levels. In particular, consider an 
online university that has an open enrolment for adult 
learners to work towards a qualification (or a given set 
of  skills  needed  for  a  particular  job).  Adults  seek 
courses  to  match  their  own  requirements,  but  the 
university can only run courses that have sufficiently 
high interest. An agent framework enables the students 
and  university  to  negotiate  which  courses  students 
select, and therefore which courses will run. 
In this  paper,  we present a  multiagent  system  for 
this e-learning scenario based on voting theory (where 
the number of candidates corresponds to the number of 
courses available that student can vote for), where an 
autonomous software agent votes on a student's behalf 
according to the student's preferences. In so doing, we 
are the first to apply voting procedures in an e-learning 
scenario.  In  particular,  we  introduce  a  novel  voting 
protocol, consisting of multiple rounds that allows the 
student  agent  to  accurately  represent  the  student's 
preferences, and that can learn from previous rounds. 
Furthermore,  we  introduce  a  number  of  different 
voting  strategies  that  student  agents  could  use,  and 
examine  the  resulting  student  satisfaction  (which 
measures how well the courses that are running match 
the  preferences  of  an  individual  student).  Through  a 
simulation, we evaluate our multiagent system and the 
proposed  strategies.  The  objective  is  to  investigate 
whether voting procedures in particular and multiagent 
technology  in  general  could  potentially  replace  a 
centralized  infrastructure  (where  the  selection  of 
courses is determined directly by the university), and to 
explore the impact of agents using different strategies.  
In  the  rest  of  this  paper,  Section  2  describes  the 
background, focusing on voting approaches and their 
relevance to agent technology. Section 3 introduces the  
 
prototype  of  the  voting  agent  based.  Section  4 
describes  a  number  of  experiments  to  test  the 
performance  of  three  different  voting  strategies  and 
analyses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
 
Voting  theory  is  part  of  the  general  area  known  as 
social choice, which is concerned with procedures for 
making collective decisions that maximize the social 
welfare  (the  sum  of  welfare  of  individual  agents), 
while  at  the  same  recognizing  that  agents  are  self-
interested and act in a way that maximizes their own 
individual  preferences.  Likewise,  in  our  e-learning 
scenario, the university would like to choose the best 
overall set of courses, while each student would like 
their  most  preferred  courses  to  be  selected.  In  the 
remainder of this section we first provide the necessary 
background on voting theory. We then go on to review 
related  papers  that  use  agent-based  technology  in  e-
learning. 
         
2.1. Voting procedures 
Social choice theory is an active area of research in 
multiagent  systems  that  enable  decisions  in  a 
decentralized way. The designer of a voting system is 
concerned  with  analyzing  and  designing  the 
mechanisms  that  are  used  for  collective  decision-
making.  In  the  last  two  decades  this  field  has 
increasingly been the area of investigation by computer 
scientists,  and  especially  researchers  in  multiagent 
systems  [8].  This  is  because  agents  are  inherently 
autonomous,  and  may  have  different  and  conflicting 
goals.  At  the  same  time,  each  agent  would  like  to 
maximize  its  own  utility.  In  such  a  setting  voting 
systems  provide  an  appropriate  solution  to  reach  a 
socially desirable decision, while taking into account 
individual preferences [11].  
A voting system applies a set of rules that govern 
how  votes  are  cast  in  an  election,  how  they  are 
aggregated,  and  how  winners  are  determined.  In  the 
simplest system, each voter has one vote and the single 
candidate who receives the most votes, irrespective of 
the percentage of these votes among the total number 
of  votes  cast,  is  declared  the  winner.  This  system, 
known as first past the post, is used for example  in 
elections for the  UK Parliament. However, there are 
many  alternative  voting  systems,  such  as  the  Borda 
count (where each voter is given multiple points, and 
the candidate with the most points wins), and approval 
voting (where a voter can vote for as many candidates 
as they want).  
The above are examples of  voting systems  where 
there is only a single winner. However, in our scenario 
we  need  a  voting  system  that  allows  for  multiple 
winners (since multiple courses need to be selected). 
Again, many possible procedures exist. For example, 
in  the  single  transferable  vote  (STV)  system,  each 
voter provides a ranked list of candidates according to 
its preferences [3]. The winner determination process 
then  proceeds  in  several  rounds.  In  each  round,  all 
votes for the most preferred candidate are counted, and 
the  candidate  who  has  received  the  least  number  of 
votes is eliminated. Then, anyone who has voted for 
the eliminated candidate as their first preference now 
has  their  second  preference  allocated  as  their  first 
preference. The process then repeats until the required 
number  of  winners  remain  [4].  The  aim  of  this 
procedure is to minimize wasted votes and to promote 
proportional representation.  
Another voting procedure used for multiple winners 
is  cumulative  voting.  Here,  each  voter  receives  a 
number of points (usually the number of points is equal 
to  the  number  of  candidates),  and  they  are  free  to 
choose how many points to allocate to each candidate. 
The candidates with the highest cumulative points are 
selected  as  winners.  The  advantage  of  cumulative 
voting (compared to e.g. STV) is that it allows an agent 
to  better  express  its  preferences.  For  example,  if  an 
agent prefers only the first candidate but has no interest 
in any of the others, then it can allocate all its points to 
the first one. This is not possible with a system that 
only  allows  an  agent  to  express  the  order  of  the 
candidates (like in the case of STV voting). 
In this paper, we introduce a novel voting procedure 
which  combined  features  from  both  STV  and 
cumulative voting. Specifically, we take advantage of 
the  features  of  cumulative  voting  to  express  the 
preferences using points, and at the same time allow 
for multiple rounds to avoid wastage by allowing the 
transfer of points in a similar way to the transfer of 
votes in STV. Having  multiple rounds also allows a 
student to learn from previous rounds and to adjust its 
voting behavior accordingly. The details of our voting 
procedure are presented in Section 3. In addition to the 
voting  procedure,  we  also  introduce  and  evaluate  a 
number of reasonable voting strategies that can be used 
by the student agents in the system.  
 
2.2. Agent Technology for e-Learning 
In  e-learning,  multiagent  systems  appear  to  be  a 
promising  approach  to  deal  with  the  challenges  in 
educational  environments.  They  can  provide  new 
patterns of learning and applications, such as personal 
assistants,  user  guides  and  alternative  help  systems, 
which  are  helpful  for  both  students  and  teachers  in 
their  computer-aided  learning-teaching  process  [6]. 
Using  multiagent  systems  to  design  educational 
systems could lead to more versatile, faster and lower  
 
cost  systems  [10].  A  number  of  researchers  have 
applied agent technology to e-learning. De Meo et al.  
[7] proposed the X-Learn system  which  is  a   XML 
based  multiagent    system    for    adaptive    e-learning 
based on user preferences and requirements.  However, 
they focus on the adaptation and how to exploit XML 
technology  facilities  for  handling  and  exchanging 
information related to e-learning activities. Shi et al. 
[9]  designed  an  integrated  multiagent  systems  for 
computer  science  education  that  focuses  on  two 
introductory  courses  where  the  learning  process  is 
student-centered,  self-paced  and  highly  interactive. 
They use Java RMI, JavaSpace and JATLite to create a 
web-based  system;  in  this  case  they  use  personal 
agents to manage student’s data and their interactions 
with course material.  
Although  these  papers  apply  agents  in  e-learning, 
none  of  these  papers  apply  any  fundamental  agent 
theories,  such  as  mechanism  design  or  social  choice 
theory, to guide their design choices. In contrast, our 
approach  is  to  apply  voting  mechanisms  to  an  e-
learning scenario where the candidates represent all the 
courses available, and where students can vote in any 
way he or she prefers. Thus our work explores, for the 
first time, voting procedures in an e-learning setting.  
 
3. The Multi-Agent System  
 
This section describes  the architecture of the  system 
(Section 3.1), the protocol and voting procedure that 
the  agents  follow  (Section  3.2),  how  we  model  the 
preferences  of  students  (Section  3.3)  and  three 
different voting strategies (Section 3.4).  
 
3.1. Architecture 
The  entities  and  objects  that  exist  in  the  system  are 
shown in Figure 1. Each agent is autonomous, that is, it 
is  in  control  of  its  own  actions  and  responses.  The 
system consists of two types of agents: student agents 
(SAs) and the university agent (UA). First the student 
expresses his or her preferences to the student agent 
(see  Section  3.3),  and  also  chooses  an  appropriate 
voting  strategy  (discussed  in  Section  3.4).  Then  the 
SAs and the UA use a voting procedure to interact with 
each other and to choose which courses to run. To this 
end,  the  UA  manages  the  votes  cast  by  the  student 
agents and decides, based on the voting procedure and 
the  votes  received,  which  courses  will  be  cancelled. 
Furthermore, after completing the entire process, it will 
provide the SAs with a final list of running courses. 
 
3.2. Voting Procedure 
In general, a protocol is the set of rules that controls 
the interactions between agents and determines the 
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Figure 1: System architecture 
 
beginning and end conditions of a given conversation 
[1]. In our system, the protocol works in several stages. 
In each stage, the student agents cast their votes for the  
courses by allocating points to each course. The course 
that receives the lowest number of cumulative points is 
cancelled,  and  the  points  that  were  allocated  to  the 
cancelled course are refunded. In the next round, the 
student agents can use these points (and any points that 
they did not use in the previous rounds), to vote again. 
Furthermore, in each round, the students are informed 
about which course is cancelled and the total number 
of  points  that  have  been  allocated  to  the  remaining 
courses  so  far.  Note  that,  once  allocated,  a  student 
cannot  retrieve  its  points,  unless  the  course  is 
cancelled. The advantage of this iterative approach is 
that votes are not wasted since points allocated to the 
cancelled  course  can  be  reused  for  the  remaining 
courses.  Furthermore,  the  student  can  use  the 
information  about  the  current  “popularity”  (i.e.  the 
current cumulative points) of the courses to guide its 
voting  behavior  (we  discuss  this  in  more  detail  in 
Section 3.4 where we discuss the voting strategies of 
students).  In  more  detail,  the  protocol  proceeds  as 
follows: 
1.  Each  student  initially  receives  an  equal  and  fixed 
number of points, IP, from the UA that they can use to 
cast their votes. 
2. Each student allocates some or all of their available 
points  to  the  available  courses  (they  do  not  have  to 
allocate all their points, but cannot allocate more than 
they have). 
3. The UA calculates the cumulative  points for each 
course.  
4.  The  UA  cancels  the  course  with  the  lowest 
cumulative points. 
5. The UA refunds the points for the cancelled course. 
6.  The  UA  informs  all  the  SAs  about  the  cancelled 
course, and the current cumulative points allocated to 
the remaining courses.   
 
7.  Now  SAs  can  vote  again  using  their  remaining 
points (this includes the refunded points as well as any 
points  which  were  not  allocated  in  the  previous 
rounds), and the process is repeated until the desired 
number of courses is remaining.  
For  example,  if  there  are  40  courses  available  in 
total, but the university only has sufficient resources 
(e.g. staff and lecture rooms) to run 30 courses, then 
the voting will proceed for 10 iterations or rounds. At 
the end of each of these rounds, the course with the 
least number of cumulative points is cancelled. 
 
3.3. Student Preferences 
Each student has its own preferences for the different 
courses that the university offers.  In our work, these 
preferences are modeled using a simple scoring model 
that describes a student's preference for each module as 
a number between 0 and 10, where 0 means that the 
student has no interest in the course. After the voting 
process has completed we can use these preferences to 
calculate a given student’s satisfaction for the running 
courses. This is calculated by summing the preferences 
for courses that are running, as a fraction of the total 
preferences.  
   For example, if there are 7 courses available in total, 
and the preferences of a student are as follows:       , 
                                               
 ,  where     is the preference  for the  i
th course. The 
university decides to only run courses 2, 4 and 6. The 
student satisfaction is then calculated as follows. The 
sum of the preferences for the running course (21) is 
divided by the sum of the preferences for all courses 
(36). So the student satisfaction S is: 
   
  
  
               
3.4. Voting Strategies 
Abstractly,  a  strategy  determines  the  agent’s  plan  of 
action to achieve a particular goal. It specifies the way 
in which an agent behaves in a given environment [11]. 
In our scenario, the strategy determines the number of 
points to allocate to the courses in each voting round, 
given the preferences of the agent and the information 
received by the UA about the voting process. In this 
paper  we  introduce  and  compare  three  different 
strategies  for  the  SAs,  namely:  proportional,  equal 
share and intelligent. In what follows we describe each 
of these strategies in detail. 
 
Proportional: The proportional strategy is included as 
an  example  of  a  simple  but  sensible  strategy. 
Consequently, it provides a good benchmark that we 
can  use  to  compare  the  performance  of  more 
sophisticated  strategies.  The  main  idea  behind  a 
proportional strategy is that, in each round of voting, 
the student agent distributes its points proportionally to 
the student’s preferences for each course. This strategy 
is simple in that it does not consider the information 
received by the UA about the current number of points 
allocated to the courses.  
In  more  detail,  the  number  of  points  allocated  to 
course  j  is  calculated  as  follows.  Let  RP  denote  the 
total  number  of  points  remaining  (in  the  first  round 
IP=RP),  m is the total number of available  courses 
available,  and  the  vector         ⃗⃗    {            } 
denotes the student preferences. Then, the total number 
of points to be allocated to course j,    is: 
 
    
  
∑   
 
   
     
 
Equal share: The equal share strategy is included as 
an example of a very simple and ineffective strategy, 
and provides a good lower bound on the performance 
of the system. An equal share strategy is based on the 
principle  that  the  SA  gives  all  modules  an  equal 
number of votes, regardless of the student’s preference. 
The  following  formula  was  used  to  calculate  voting 
points each course: 
    
  
 
 
 
Intelligent: The intelligent strategy is included as an 
example  of  what  can  be  achieved  with  a  more 
sophisticated  strategy  that  learns  as  the  voting 
procedure progresses from one round to the next. Its 
effectiveness  can  be  gauged  by  comparing  it  to  the 
proportional strategy and the lower bound given by the 
equal share strategy. The main idea behind this strategy 
is  that,  in  each  round,  the  agent  tries  to  predict  the 
probability that a course will be cancelled based on the 
number  of  points  currently  awarded  to  each  course 
from previous rounds. Then, based on this probability, 
it  can  calculate  its  expected  satisfaction  for  a  given 
allocation of points, and it will allocate the points such 
that the expected satisfaction is maximized.  
   In  more  detail,  the  probability  of  a  course  being 
cancelled is estimated using a softmax function, which 
is commonly used in discrete choice theory to make 
decisions  in  the  case  of  incomplete  information  [5]. 
The probability that a course i is going to be cancelled 
in the future is given by: 
 
              ⃗    
 
         
∑           
   
  
 
∑  
         
∑           
   
  
   
   
 
  
 
Where     is the cumulative number of points which 
have so far been allocated to course  i, and    is the 
number of points that the student agent is planning to 
allocate to course i in the current voting round, and   ⃗  is 
the vector of points to be allocated. Furthermore,   is 
constant which enables a range of different strategies. 
For  example,  if       ,  then  each  course  is  equally 
likely to be cancelled, irrespective of the cumulative 
number  of  points  currently  allocated.  At  the  other 
extreme,  as       ,  the  course  with  the  lowest  total 
number of points will be cancelled with probability 1, 
and all other courses will be cancelled with probability 
0. All other cases fall somewhere in between. In our 
experiments  we  tune  the  parameter     such  that  it 
performs well in practice. 
    We now show how we can use this probability to 
calculate the expected satisfaction, ES, of the student, 
and how to find the allocation which maximizes this 
expected utility. The expected satisfaction is given by: 
     ⃗     ∑                   ⃗        
 
   
  
Note  that  the  expected  utility  depends  on   ⃗⃗ ,  i.e.  the 
number of points it is going to allocate to each course 
in  the  next  round.  The  next  step  is  then  to  find  the 
allocation  that  maximises  this  expected  utility.  We 
estimate this using a search algorithm based on random 
sampling, which proceeds as follows:   
1. We  randomly  generate  an  allocation  vector     ⃗⃗⃗  
subject to the constraint that the total number of 
points is equal to the maximum number of points 
that we would like to spend in the current round.  
2. The student agent calculates the expected 
satisfaction.    
3. If  the  current  solution  has  a  higher  expected 
satisfaction than any previous solution, then keep 
the solution. Otherwise, discard it.  
4. This process is repeated for 1000 times and the 
solution with the highest expected utility is kept. 
Finally, to complete the strategy, we need to specify 
(1) how many total points to allocate in each round, 
and  (2)  how  to  allocate  the  points  in  the  very  first 
round (since at this point we have no information about 
the  probability  of  a  course  being  cancelled).  To 
address  the  first  question,  note  that  we  do  not 
necessarily want to spend all points in the first round, 
since  then  we  have  no  more  points  left  to  use  in 
subsequent rounds to take advantage of the information 
that we receive in these rounds. We tried a number of 
different settings, and we found that allocating half of 
the  points  (including  any  points  refunded  from 
cancelled courses) in each round to perform well. In 
the last voting round we allocate all remaining points. 
To address the second question, in the first round we 
use the proportional strategy (but only use 50% of the 
available points).  
  
4. Evaluation 
 
The objective of this section is to evaluate our novel 
voting procedure and to explore the impact of the three 
strategies  described  in  the  previous  section  on  the 
overall student satisfaction. In particular, we consider 
the social welfare as the performance measure, which 
is  calculated  as  the  sum  of  the  satisfactions  of  all 
students.  We  do  this  by  simulating  the  multiagent 
system, as well as the student preferences. In this way 
we can see, for example, if the voting approach might 
advantage  those  students  who  use  more  intelligent 
agents.  In  addition,  we  compare  the  results  to  the 
optimal social welfare, i.e. the social welfare when the 
overall most preferred courses are selected.  
There are many factors that influence the behavior 
of the agents. In order to evaluate the strategies, we 
now  identify  the  variables  and  present  a  number  of 
meaningful  scenarios.  The  following  variables  were 
identified: 
  Number of courses (m): This is the total number of 
courses that the university provides and in which the 
student can vote for.  
  Number of running modules (r): This is the remaining 
total number of courses after the ones with the lowest 
student interest have been cancelled.  
  Number of students (n): This is the total number of 
students in the system. 
We  vary  the  above  values  for  different  scenarios, 
which are explained in detail in Section 4.3. In addition 
to  the  above  variables,  we  also  have  a  number  of 
constants: 
Initial points (IP): This is the number of points that 
each  student  initially  receives.  Without  loss  of 
generality, we set this value to 100 in the experiments.  
 : This is used when calculating the probability of a 
course being cancelled for the intelligent strategy (see 
Section 3.4). Throughout our experiments, we set this 
value to 5 since it was shown in initial tests to perform 
well. 
 
4.1. Initialization of Student Preferences 
The  most  straightforward  approach  to  initialize  the 
preferences  is  by  randomly  setting  the  satisfaction. 
However,  in  our  initial  experiments  we  found  that, 
when  the  student  population  is  large  and  when  the 
preferences are initialized completely randomly, voting  
 
has little effect because it does not really matter which 
courses are selected: for any subset of courses, there 
are  many  student  who  have  a  high  satisfaction. 
Consequently, even the equal share strategy performed 
close to optimal. Furthermore, in practice preferences 
are not independent but there  are groups of  students 
with  similar  interests.  To  address  these  issues,  we 
introduced a bias in the preferences. 
In detail, for each student and each course we start 
by  randomly  generating  preferences  from  a  uniform 
distribution between 0 and 10. Then, for a subset of 
students we multiply the preferences of the subset of 
courses  by  a  factor  of  2.  Then  we  limit  all  the 
preferences to be no more than 10. The result is that, 
because of the limit, this subset of students all favor a 
particular subset of courses.  At the same time, their 
preferences are not the same.  
 
4.2. Scenarios 
In  our  experiment  we  considered  three  different 
scenarios.  These  differ  in  terms  of  the  number  of 
students, the number of total courses, and the number 
of  running  courses.  We  choose  these  scenarios  to 
reflect  the  kind  of  courses  typical  in  UK  computer 
science  department.  We  consider  a  large 
(undergraduate), medium (smaller undergraduate) and 
small (postgraduate) course. Table 1 shows the settings 
for these scenarios.  
Table 1. Different setting to the scenarios 
Scenario  #courses 
(m) 
#running courses 
(r)  #students (n) 
1  51  10  20  30  40  100 
2  33  9  18  27  60 
3  15  4  8  12  20 
 
4.3. Analysis 
We now proceed with discussing the results. In doing 
so, we consider two different cases. First, we consider 
the  case  where  all  students  use  identical  voting 
strategies,  and  we  compare  the  results  of  different 
voting  strategies.  In  the  second  case,  different 
proportions of students in the population use different 
strategies  and  we  compare  the  resulting  student 
satisfaction.  In  each  of  the  experiments  that  follow, 
each scenario was run 30 times with different student 
preferences. Thus, the results shown are the average 
results over these runs. 
 
4.3.1 Identical Voting Strategies 
First,  we  measure  the  performance  of  each  strategy 
separately and compare this with the optimal solution 
(this  is  calculated  by  assuming  that  the  university 
knows  all  the  student  preferences  and  selects  the 
courses which maximize the social welfare).  
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the results for scenarios 1, 2 
and  3  respectively.  Here,  the  y  axis  shows  the 
percentage of student satisfaction. This is calculated by 
the  total  satisfaction  of  the  running  courses,  as  a 
percentage  of  the  total  satisfaction  if  all  the  courses 
would be running. Furthermore, on the x axis we vary 
the total number of running courses (while keeping the 
other  parameters  in  the  scenarios  fixed).  The  graphs 
show the differences in the satisfaction of the agents 
using different strategies and also compares this with 
the satisfaction of the optimal solution. 
These  results  show  that  the  outcome  of  the 
proportional strategy is almost identical to the optimal 
strategy (although this is not visible in the figure, there 
is  some  difference  but  this  is  not  statistically 
significant),  and  the  intelligent  strategy  does  slightly 
less well but is still very close to optimal. On the other 
hand,  we  see  that  the  equal  share  strategy  does 
significantly worse. This suggests that a decentralized 
solution using voting results in high quality solutions 
that are comparable to optimal.  
Interestingly, in this setting the intelligent strategy 
performs slightly worse than the simpler proportional 
strategy. This can be expected because proportional is 
similar to voting the “true” preferences, i.e. it does not 
try  to  outsmart  the  system.  However,  it  may  be 
possible for a group of students to outsmart the simple 
proportional strategy and increase their satisfaction at 
the  expense  of  those  students  using  the  proportional 
strategy.  To  analyze  this,  in  the  next  we  consider  a 
setting where students use different strategies. 
 
Figure 2. Scenario 1 
 
 
Figure 3. Scenario 2  
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Figure 4. Scenario 3  
 
4.3.2 Combination of Strategies 
In  the  next  set  of  experiments  we  compare  the  case 
where  a  proportion  of  the  students  use  one  strategy, 
and the remainder of the students uses another strategy. 
Furthermore, we bias the preferences (as described in 
Section 4.1) in such a way that the students using the 
same  strategy  are  also  likely  to  have  similar 
preferences.  In the results that follow, the y axis shows 
the percentage of satisfaction for each group of agents 
using a particular strategy. Furthermore, on the x axis 
we vary the proportion of students using a particular 
strategy. For example, in Figure 5, 90-10 means that 90 
students use the proportional strategy, and 10 students 
use the equal share strategy. In the experiments that 
follow, we set the number of running courses to 40 for 
scenario  1,  18  for  scenario  2  and  4  for  scenario  3. 
However,  the  results  are  very  similar  for  the  other 
settings  in  Table  1,  and  there  are  no  qualitative 
differences. 
The  results  in  figures  5  and  6  show  that  the 
intelligent  and  proportional  strategies  are  both 
significantly better than the equal share, irrespective of 
the  proportion  of  students  that  use  this  strategy.  On 
average, the improvement is around 8% compared to  
the equal share strategy. The results for other scenarios 
are very similar and not shown to avoid repetition. 
 
 
Figure 5. Scenario 1: Proportional vs. Equal Share  
 
Figure 6. Scenario 1:  Intelligent vs. Equal Share  
 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the results with both the 
intelligent strategy and the proportional strategy for the 
3  different  scenarios.  The  result  show  that,  as  the 
number  of  students  allocated  to  a  particular  strategy 
increases,  the  student  satisfaction  for  these  students 
also increases. However, this is mainly because of the 
bias that has been introduced; since students with the 
same  strategy  have  similar  preferences,  when  more 
students  have  these  preferences  they  have  greater 
voting power since they act as a group.  
Comparing  the  intelligent  and  proportional 
strategies,  it  can  be  seen  that  there  is  not  much 
difference between them. Although in some cases, as 
in Figure 9, the intelligent strategy slightly outperforms 
the  proportional  strategy  (given  the  same  number  of 
students  are  using  that  strategy),  in  the  other  two 
scenarios,  the  proportional  strategy  outperforms  the 
intelligent  strategy.    This  suggests  that  the  system 
cannot  be  easily  exploited  by  an  intelligent  strategy. 
We  have  also  tried  to  vary  the  parameters  of  the 
intelligent strategy (such as the beta parameter), but the 
results do not change significantly.   
 
 
Figure 7. Scenario 1: Intelligent vs. Proportional  
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Figure   08. Scenario 2: Intelligent vs. Proportional   
 
 
Figure 9. Scenario 3: Intelligent vs. Proportional   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we presented a multiagent system based 
for this e-learning scenario based on voting theory. We 
first introduced a novel voting procedure where agents 
allocate points to different courses and voting occurs in 
several rounds. This way the agents are able to freely 
express their preferences and at the same time use the 
information  provided  from  previous  rounds  to  vote 
intelligently  and  strategically.  We  then  introduced 
three  different  voting  strategies,  and  evaluated  their 
performance in a range of scenarios.  The results show 
that even a simple voting strategy provides outcomes 
which are close to optimal. Furthermore, our intelligent 
strategy was unable to exploit other, more naïve voters. 
This is encouraging for the e-learning domain, where 
institutions are often required to be equitable. 
Our future work consists of two parts. First of all, 
we  intend  to  consider  combinatorial  preferences. 
Whereas the student agents in this paper have simple 
additive  preferences,  in  practice  the  preferences  are 
often interdependent. That is, the preferences for one 
course  depend  on  whether  or  not  another  course  is 
running.    We  believe  that  our  voting  procedure  is 
particularly powerful for such combinatorial settings, 
especially  since  calculating  the  optimal  solution 
becomes computationally intractable. Furthermore, we 
intend  to  consider  other  intelligent  voting  strategies 
and  alternative  voting  procedures,  and  explore 
constraints  such  as  limitations  on  the  number  of 
courses  that  a  student  can  take,  and  having  pre-
requisite courses.  
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